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GOING WITH THE FLOW: THE MONTANA




Article II of the Montana Constitution enumerates individual rights,
including several that are not present in the United States Constitution. The
right to participate in government,1 its corollary, the right to know, 2 the
right of individual privacy,3 and the right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment4 protect Montanans' individual freedom and counter the potential for
overreaching government power. Enshrining these rights in the Constitu-
tion was a bold, unique, and far-reaching step in 1972. However, these
rights are no more "radical" than the rights embodied in the United States
Constitution. 5 Nor was the enumeration of these rights accidental or ill-
considered; the rights reflect the overriding desire of the delegates to the
1972 Montana Constitutional Convention to develop a civil society respon-
sive to the needs of its citizens.
* I have practiced law for 26 years, focusing on natural resource, environmental and constitu-
tional cases, and currently serve as a Visiting Professor at the Vermont Law School and the University
of Montana School of Law. I want to thank University of Montana Law School student John Sullivan
for his significant, excellent contributions to researching and writing this article, and the editorial staff at
the Montana Law Review for their patient and timely input and critique.
1. Mont. Const. art. II, § 8.
2. Id. at art. 1I, § 9.
3. Id. at art. II, § 10.
4. Id. at art. I, § 3; id. at art. IX, § 1.
5. At the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights were ratified, no other country in the world had a
written constitution with such expansive individual rights.
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The Montana Constitution furthers the democratic premise that the ul-
timate power rests with the people by allowing voters to determine, once
every 20 years, whether to call a new constitutional convention. 6 The first
of these votes occurred in 1990, when Montanans rejected a convention. 7
In 2010, the issue was again on the general ballot. Proponents of a new
constitutional convention argued that the 1972 Constitution needs major re-
vision and that some constitutional rights should be eliminated., As dis-
cussed below, the proponents of revision had no legal or economic bases
supporting their claims. 9 The campaign was premised on misinformation
and a misunderstanding of how the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted
the Constitution. The voters wisely rejected the call.10 However, support-
ers of amending Montana's Constitution remain active in state politics,''
and the 2011 Montana Legislature recently debated several bills that would
have asked voters to reconsider multiple provisions of the 1972 Constitu-
tion. 12
The Montana Constitution does not need to be rewritten or amended.
The rights contained in the 1972 Constitution have been developed in ac-
cordance with long-standing judicial principles of constitutional interpreta-
tion, reflecting the delegates' intentions and gradually reshaping our legal
traditions. While the Court has not hesitated to give effect to these rights,
its approach has been measured and restrained. Contrary to what the propo-
nents of a new constitutional convention claimed, the rights unique to the
Montana Constitution have not been confused by the courts, interpreted to
6. Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 3.
7. Montanans voted against calling a new constitutional convention in 1990 by a vote of 245,009
to 55,630. Mont. Sec. of St., 1990 Montana State Election Results: Statewide General Election Can-
vass, Nov. 6, 1990 (data on file with the Mont. L. Rev.).
8. State Senators Joe Balyeat & Ken Miller, Argument for CC-2, in Voter Information Pamphlet:
Your Guide to the 2010 Ballot Issues 2-4 (Mont. Sec. of St. 2010) (available at http://sos.mt.gov/
elections/archives/2010s/2010/ 201OVIP.pdf).
9. Justice James Nelson has provided a powerful counterpoint, arguing that the rights guaranteed
in 1972 are even more important today, given the wide-ranging problems we face. James C. Nelson,
Keeping Faith with the Vision: Interpreting a Constitution for This and Future Generations, 71 Mont. L.
Rev. 299 (2010).
10. Mont. Sec. of St., 2010 Montana State Election Results: Statewide General Election Canvass,
Nov. 2, 2010 (available at http://sos.mt.gov/elections/Archives/20lOs/20l0/20l0GeneralElection_
OfficialStatewideCanvass.pdf).
11. For example, Joe Balyeat, an author of the Proponents' statement contained in the Voter Infor-
mation Pamphlet, is a Montana State Senator.
12. For example, the Legislature considered House Bill 292, which would have changed Article II,
§ 2 to provide a right to a "clean, healthful, and economically productive environment." Mont. H. 292,
62d Reg. Sess. (Jan. 20, 2011) (emphasis added). The bill was widely favored by coal, oil, gas, and
other extractive industries. After passing the House, House Bill 292 failed its third reading in the Senate
by a vote of 26-24. Mont. Legis., Detailed Bill Information, HB 292, http://laws.leg.mt.govlawsl 1/law
0203w$.startup, search by HB 292 (last updated Apr. 28, 2011). See also Mont. Legis., Bill Search
Results, Constitutional Amendment Proposals, http://laws.leg.mt.gov/laws l l/law02O3w$.startup, search
by Constitutional Amendment Proposals (last updated Apr. 28, 2011).
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trample on private property, or used to suppress the economy. In fact, the
Montana Supreme Court has been rather conservative in its constitutional
interpretation and has certainly not been overzealous.
This article examines how the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted
the rights to open government, privacy, and a clean and healthful environ-
ment. The federal Constitution lacks textual counterparts to these rights; 13
thus, the Montana Court must define them de novo. Surveying the Court's
approach to these rights helps test whether the moniker of judicial activism
is properly affixed to the Montana Court's interpretation of new rights or
whether the Court has utilized a more conservative approach, applying
long-recognized canons of constitutional construction. This article demon-
strates that the Court has construed new constitutional rights conservatively.
Claims that the Court interprets constitutional rights to "micro-meddle"' 14 in
business, property, and personal affairs-claims that formed the backbone
of a call for a new Constitutional Convention in 2010-are simply false.
II. A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE 1972 MONTANA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
In the 1960s, the Montana Legislature began investigating ways to im-
prove the 1889 Montana Constitution. 15 The Legislature assigned this task
to the Legislative Council, which found that the Constitution required sig-
nificant changes to better serve Montanans. 16 At the end of this investiga-
tion, the Revision Committee unanimously supported convening a constitu-
tional convention.t 7 Montanans voted in favor of calling a constitutional
convention in a referendum held in November 1970;18 the referendum
passed by 133,482 to 71,643 votes. 19
The Constitutional Convention convened in January 1972 in the state
capital of Helena.20 Montanans had elected 100 delegates to draft the new
constitution, none of whom had any experience in constitution drafting. 2'
The delegates included 58 Democrats, 36 Republicans, and 6 independ-
13. Of course the United States Supreme Court has recognized a right to privacy in various con-
texts; however, it is not a textual right. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the
First Amendment contains a penumbra of rights, including the right to privacy).
14. Balyeat & Miller, supra n. 8, at 2-4.




18. Id. at 9.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 10.
21. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 15, at 10.
2392011
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ents, 22 but no sitting legislators because the 1889 Constitution prohibited
current legislators from serving as delegates. 23 Instead, Montanans from a
variety of backgrounds, occupations, and age groups came together. 24 The
Constitution drafted by these delegates was ratified by Montana voters in
June 1972-albeit by a slim margin in a vote of 116,415 to 113,883.2 5
The 1972 Constitution is remarkable for several reasons. As stated
above, the delegates were a diverse group of citizens from many walks of
life. 26 Also, the 1960s and early 1970s were a time of unparalleled activ-
ism-civil rights, anti-war protests, feminism, and the nascent environmen-
tal movement were powerful elements of the political discourse that was the
context for the Convention. The document drafted contains 17 rights or
obligations that have no textual counterpart in the United States Constitu-
tion.27 Because these rights could only be given meaning through the inter-
pretations of the Montana Supreme Court, the 1972 Constitution ensured
that the State's constitutional jurisprudence would be rich and contentious
in the decades that followed.
III. THE NORMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
Over two centuries ago, the United States Supreme Court had to invent
a way to interpret our federal Constitution. The very notion of a written
constitution, containing three distinct branches of government, protecting a
wide range of individual rights, and with a decidedly anti-majoritarian
amendment procedure, was novel in 1789.28 Who would have the final say
as to what the Constitution's often vague, imprecise phrases actually
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id. at 10 (citing 42nd Legis. Assembly v. Lennon, 481 P.2d 330 (Mont. 1971)).
24. Id. at 11.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings vol. 1, 30-64 (Mont. Legis. & Legis. Council
1972) (available at http://courts.mt.gov/library/montana-laws.mcpx) (Delegate Information). The 100
delegates included 24 lawyers, 19 women, 5 ministers, and 3 professors, as well as ranchers, farmers,
and business leaders. Id.; see also Elison & Snyder, supra n. 15, at 11.
27. See Elison & Snyder, supra n. 15, at 20 (citing Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State Consti-
tutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1095, 1122 (1985)). Collins lists the following Article
II sections not contained in the Bill of Rights: § 4 (rights to dignity, equality, and nondiscrimination),
§ 8 (right to participate), § 9 (right to know), § 10 (right of privacy), § 14 (adult rights), § 15 (rights of
non-adults), § 16 (administration of justice), § 18 (state subject to suit), § 20 (initiation of criminal
proceedings), § 23 (detention), § 27 (imprisonment for debt), § 28 (rights of the convicted), § 29 (award
of litigation expenses in eminent domain proceedings), § 30 (treason and descent of estates), § 32 (civil-
ian control of the military), § 33 (importation of armed persons), and § 35 (special considerations for
servicepersons and veterans). Collins, 63 Tex. L. Rev. at 1122 n. 184.
28. Though the United States inherited much of its common law from England, England-a monar-
chy-could not provide a model for constitutional governance. As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky notes,
the framers could have chosen a different model, such as a series of statutory enactments, to form a new
government. The choice of a constitution was deliberate, with dramatic consequences. Erwin Chemer-
insky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 8-9 (3d ed., Aspen 2006).
Vol. 72
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meant? Chief Justice John Marshall answered that question relatively early
in this country's history in Marbury v. Madison.29 Marbury and other early
opinions defined both the role of the judiciary and the path that courts
should take in resolving constitutional questions. These norms, some of
which are outlined below, establish how the United States Supreme Court
has both asserted and limited its role in interpreting the Constitution. These
norms provide a yardstick to assess how the Montana Supreme Court has
interpreted and implemented the 1972 Montana Constitution.
A. The Supreme Court Is the Final Arbiter of the Law
Vital to the separation of governmental powers, the judiciary serves as
the only check on the tyranny of the majority as expressed through legisla-
tive action or the unbridled exercise of executive authority. 30 Chief Justice
John Marshall established a touchstone principle of American jurisprudence
when he stated: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."31 With those words, the Court over-
ruled the Congressional Act of 1789 for violating Article III, § 2, clause 2
of the Constitution and established the authority of the judiciary.
The Court also developed means to balance constitutional rights
against other important societal interests, particularly in the realm of the
individual rights contained in the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amend-
ment.32 A right may be given strong protection under a strict scrutiny anal-
ysis, which often renders laws unconstitutional-"strict in scrutiny, fatal in
fact." In other contexts, the same right may be afforded a lesser level of
protection. 33 In other cases, competing constitutional rights have to be bal-
anced against each other.34 Oliver Wendell Holmes's oft-quoted metaphor
that some speech-like falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theater-is not
29. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
30. Whether quashing President Truman's seizure of steel mills (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)), commanding President Nixon to turn over his presidential tapes (U.S. v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)), or demanding that President Bush give Guantanamo detainees a measure
of constitutional-based civil rights (Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)), the United States Su-
preme Court has exercised its authority to reign in the executive.
31. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
32. E.g. U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). The path to give some rights more
legal strength than others began with the famous Footnote 4 in Carolene Products. There, the United
States Supreme Court established the norm that even "absolute" constitutional rights like the demand for
equal protection or due process could be interpreted differently, depending on the nature and purpose of
the government's intrusion on those rights.
33. The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment illustrates the point. The Supreme
Court uses strict scrutiny for racial classification. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995). The Court applies middle tier scrutiny for gender classifications. Miss. U.for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982). In Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), the Court applied rational
basis for age-based classifications.
34. E.g. Empl. Div., Dept. of Nati. Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2011
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protected despite the absolute language of the First Amendment 35 embodies
the Court's practice of balancing constitutional rights against broader socie-
tal concerns.
The Montana Supreme Court has adhered to these norms when inter-
preting the Montana Constitution. Indeed, the Constitution itself vests the
Montana Supreme Court with "the exclusive power to construe and inter-
pret legislative Acts, as well as provisions of the Constitution." 36 The
Court, respectful of its duty as the final arbiter of the law, has frequently
voided actions of the legislative and executive branches when they run con-
trary to the rights and responsibilities found in the Montana Constitution. 37
The Montana Supreme Court also follows the United States Supreme
Court's balancing approach, weighing the severity of an infringement
against other societal interests to implement the constitutional rights
adopted under the 1972 Constitution. The Montana Court utilizes the dif-
ferent levels of scrutiny to analyze constitutional rights, typically applying
strict scrutiny to the fundamental rights contained in Article II and lesser
degrees of scrutiny to rights contained in other portions of the constitu-
tion.38 When competing constitutional rights such as privacy and open gov-
ernment are at issue, the Montana Court balances the interests protected by
both rights. 39
B. Avoidance of Constitutional Issues When Cases Can Be
Resolved on Other Grounds
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that courts
should avoid constitutional interpretation when cases can be resolved on
other grounds. 40 The avoidance doctrine is premised on judicial self-re-
straint; declaring statutes unconstitutional is a counter-majoritarian infringe-
ment on the democratic process.41 The avoidance doctrine prompts courts
confronted with a challenge to a statute's constitutionality to resolve ambi-
guities in favor of preserving the constitutionality of the statute.42 The un-
35. Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
36. In re License Revocation of Gildersleeve, 942 P.2d 705, 709 (Mont. 1997) (quoting State v.
Leslie, 50 P.2d 959, 962 (1935)).
37. See Nelson, supra n. 9, at 306-308.
38. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. QualitY, 988 P.2d 1236, 1244-1245 (Mont. 1998).
39. The Montana Court is faced with a unique constitutional balancing act because of the textual
fundamental rights to both privacy and open government. The Court's treatment of these rights is dis-
cussed in detail in Sections V and VI below.
40. E.g. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 U.S. 1800 (2009); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
41. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932)).
42. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) ("The canon of constitutional avoidance
comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be
Vol. 72
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derlying theory rests on the presumption that Congress legislates within the
bounds of the Constitution.
The principle of constitutional avoidance is enshrined in Montana ju-
risprudence as well:
Certain constraints govern the Court's power to determine the constitutional-
ity of statutes. Among those constraints is the principle that we will not rule
on the constitutionality of a legislative act if we are able to decide the case
without reaching constitutional considerations. 43
For example, in Baxter v. State,44 a coalition of "right-to-die" advocates
sought to have portions of Montana's criminal code declared an unconstitu-
tional infringement on the constitutional rights to privacy and individual
dignity under Article II of the Montana Constitution. However, the Court
determined that the statutes at issue were constitutional and resolved the
case on statutory grounds, expressly avoiding a constitutional analysis of
right-to-die issues.45 Constitutional avoidance also extends to cases where
application of common law principles can resolve a case. In Sunburst
School District No. 2 v. Texaco, for example, the Court held that the jury
should not have been instructed on a constitutional tort theory when the
common law of public nuisance provided an adequate remedy. 46 These re-
cent cases reflect the Montana Court's long history of avoiding constitu-
tional questions when possible.
C. Appropriate Use of the Delegates' Intent to Give Meaning to the
Constitution's Text
The United States Supreme Court strives to give meaning to the United
States Constitution that is consistent with both the plain words of the text
and the intentions of its drafters. Because the Constitution pronounces
rights and responsibilities in broad, vague terms, 47 sometimes couched in
susceptible of more than one construction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing between
them."). However, the larger principle of statutory construction that requires courts to first interpret the
plain language of the statute militates against the avoidance doctrine. E.g. U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001) ("The canon of constitutional avoidance has no application in
the absence of statutory ambiguity.").
43. Gildersleeve, 942 P.2d at 709.
44. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
45. Id. at 1215. Justice Nelson concurred, but would have reached the constitutional question:
"Although the Court has chosen to decide this case on the narrow statutory ground suggested by the
State of Montana (as an alternative approach) in its briefs on appeal . . . and although physician aid in
dying is protected statutorily (as the Court holds under this alternative approach), physician aid in dying
is also firmly protected by Montana's Constitution." Id. at 1224 (Nelson, J., concurring).
46. Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079, 1093-1094 (Mont. 2007).
47. The list of broad and vague terms in both the United States and Montana Constitutions is long
indeed and does not require much elaboration. Such phrases in the federal Constitution include "com-
merce among the several States," "equal protection," and "due process." The same is true for
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impossible absolutes, 48 courts must interpret their meaning. Judicial con-
struction has become grounded in paradigms like original intent, original
meaning, and evolving norms (a "living" or "pragmatic" constitution). The
impact of these various paradigms on the law reflects the philosophies of
those who command a majority of the Court at any given time.49
Undertaking the "originalist" versus "living" constitution debate-a
hot topic among the current justices of the United States Supreme Court-is
not necessary in Montana.50 Montana's Constitution was adopted only 40
years ago, and the verbatim transcript of the 1972 Convention provides rel-
atively clear guidance as to the delegates' intentions. Also, the context of
Montana's Constitution is modem; it is not necessary to sift through centu-
ries-old historical records to glean the real meaning of constitutional rights
and responsibilities-currently the approach favored by proponents of the
original meaning paradigm. 51 The Montana Supreme Court has consist-
ently turned to the 1972 Convention transcript as an authoritative source for
its interpretation of key phrases.52 In so doing, the Court has remained
faithful to its duty to reflect the delegates' intentions and understanding as
to how those phrases should operate to affect the lives of Montana citizens.
These principles of constitutional interpretation-the Court as final ar-
biter of the Constitution, constitutional avoidance, respect for the profound
importance of the document, and respect for the framers' intentions-pro-
vide a means to assess how the Montana Supreme Court has addressed
three of the important and controversial rights contained in the 1972 Consti-
tution: the rights to a clean and healthful environment, privacy, and to par-
ticipate in government. As shown below, the Court interprets the Montana
Constitution with great respect for accepted canons of constitutional con-
struction.
Montana; terms like "privacy," "clean and healthful environment," and "dignity of the human being"
require judicial interpretation to effectuate their constitutional meaning.
48. For example, the absolute pronouncement in the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution that Congress shall make no law that abridges freedom of speech has never been literally inter-
preted. Chemerinsky, supra n. 28, at 924-925.
49. See e.g. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (exemplifying the differences between the original-
ist and pragmatic approaches). For a more thorough discussion, see Stephen Breyer, Making Our De-
mocracy Work: A Judge's View (Alfred A. Knopf 2010).
50. See Nelson, supra n. 9, at 317. Justice Nelson argues that the 1972 Constitution was intended
to be interpreted as a living document that adapts to the changing conditions and evolving norms of our
society-not a collection of rules to be rigidly applied based solely on the knowledge, experience, and
understandings at the time of ratification.
51. See e.g. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 489 (1989).
52. See e.g. State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010); State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2009);
Hernandez v. Bd. of Co. Commrs., 189 P.3d 638 (Mont. 2008).
244 Vol. 72
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IV. THE RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT
The right to a clean and healthful environment, embodied in Article II,
§ 3, and Article IX, § 1,53 is both unique and controversial. While the
Montana Constitution is one of several state constitutions that contain ex-
plicit environmental rights, 54 Montana is the only state to recognize that
right as fundamental, on par with other fundamental rights such as freedom
of speech.55 The Court's interpretation of this right has plenty of critics.
56
Advocates of another constitutional convention decry the right to a clean
and healthful environment as being anti-business. 57 However, a careful
parsing of the Court's decisions regarding the right demonstrates that the
Court has approached its duties with caution and has adhered to accepted
tenets of constitutional construction.
In 1999, in Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department
of Environmental Quality ("MEIC"), the Court unanimously held that Arti-
cle II, § 3 and Article IX, § 1 created a "fundamental right" to a clean and
healthful environment. 58 State actions that implicate this right are therefore
subjected to strict scrutiny-the highest level of judicial review. 59 Al-
though decided 27 years after the 1972 Constitution was enacted, MEIC
was the Court's first definitive interpretation of the Constitution's environ-
53. The environmental provisions read as follows (emphasis added):
Mont. Const. art. II, § 3: Inalienable Rights. All persons are born free and have certain inalienable
rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's
basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and seeking their safety, health, and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all
persons recognize the corresponding responsibilities.
Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1: Protection and Improvement. (1) The state and each person shall main-
tain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations. (2)
The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty. (3) The legislature
shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system from degra-
dation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural
resources.
54. E.g. Ill. Const. art. XI, § 1 ("The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to
provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations.").
55. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Mon-
tana's Environmental Provisions, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 157, 165-166 (2003).
56. See John L. Horwich, Montana's Constitutional Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execu-
tion or Self-Delusion?, 57 Mont. L. Rev. 323, 328-332 (1996); Charles S. Johnson, Constitution Con-
vention a Quiet Measure on the Ballot, Missoulian (Oct. 4, 2010) (available at http://missoulian.
com/news/state-and-regional/articled800f8e6-d045-1 ldf-a487-001cc4c03286.html); Balyeat & Miller,
supra n. 8, at 2-3.
57. The proponents argued that the Court's interpretation of the right to a clean and healthful envi-
ronment "empowers judges and bureaucratic rulemakers to micro-meddle in your property rights, busi-
ness affairs, and personal conduct .... When Montana's expansive constitution is placed in the hands of
our overzealous courts, the net result is an assault with a deadly weapon on Montana's economy and
jobs." Balyeat & Miller, supra n. 8, at 2-3.
58. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1246.
59. Id.
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mental provisions. The Court's analysis-based on the plain language of
the Constitution, prior case law, and the delegates' intentions as expressed
in the Convention transcript-tracks the norms of constitutional construc-
tion. Though the holding had a profound effect on environmental law in
Montana, it can hardly be depicted as unfettered judicial activism. Rather,
the Court effectuated the plain language of the Constitution and the clearly
expressed intent of the delegates to afford environmental rights constitu-
tional protection.
In MEIC, the Court voided a statute that exempted certain types of
discharges from review under the Water Quality Act.60 Giving fealty to the
concept of stare decisis, the Court turned to its own precedent regarding
other fundamental rights in Article II to determine, first, when the right to a
clean and healthful environment is implicated and, second, the appropriate
level of scrutiny. 61 In both In the Matter of C.H.62 and Wadsworth v.
State,63 the Court determined that rights enumerated in the Declaration of
Rights (Article II) are fundamental and that fundamental rights are tradi-
tionally provided strict scrutiny.
The Court also turned to the transcripts of the Constitutional Conven-
tion. The Court did not have to probe deeply to understand that the dele-
gates intended environmental rights to be fundamental. The environmental
provisions were intensively debated at the Constitutional Convention, and
the Court in MEIC cited to the transcripts more than a dozen times to con-
strue the meaning of the right to a clean and healthful environment. 64 The
debates reveal a profound desire among several of the delegates to create a
strong environmental right; some delegates even argued that "clean and
healthful" did not go far enough, because it would allow ongoing degrada-
tion. 65 The Court also found that the transcript reveals the delegates' inten-
tion to conjoin Article 1I's "inalienable right" to a clean and healthful envi-
ronment with the more specific commands of Article IX.66 Article IX pro-
vides that individuals and the State have a duty to "maintain and improve a
clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future genera-
tions."'67 The MEIC Court concluded, based on both the text of the 1972
60. Id. at 1237.
61. Id. at 1245.
62. In re C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1984).
63. Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (Mont. 1996).
64. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1246-1249.
65. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings, supra n. 26, at vol. 4. 1201, 1205-1206 (Ver-
batim Transcript).
66. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1247-1249.
67. Mont. Const art. II, § 3; id. at art. IX, § 1.
Vol. 72
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Constitution and the delegates' intent, that there is a fundamental environ-
mental right in Montana's Constitution.68
Determining when that fundamental environmental right is implicated
has proven more difficult. The task is often easier with other rights. For
example, when the government passes a law making it unlawful to burn a
flag, the law clearly implicates an individual's right to free expression. 69
Or when the government restricts a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion, the government infringes on her liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause. 70 The question of when the government affects environ-
mental rights is less clear-cut.
To answer this question in MEIC, the Court again turned to the Con-
vention transcript:
[T]he delegates' intention was to provide language and protections which are
both anticipatory and preventative. The delegates did not intend to merely
prohibit that degree of environmental degradation which can be conclusively
linked to ill health or physical endangerment. Our constitution does not re-
quire that dead fish float on the surface of our state's rivers and streams
before its farsighted environmental protections can be invoked.
The right to a clean and healthful environment does not require a person to
suffer harm before the right is implicated. As the United States Supreme
Court has noted, "[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature ... is often perma-
nent or ... irreparable. ' 71 It makes no sense to create a constitutional envi-
ronmental right, but require that the harm it seeks to prevent come to pass
before a court can provide redress. In MEIC, the Montana Supreme Court
found that the threat of harm caused by adding arsenic-laden groundwater
to the Blackfoot River was sufficient to invoke the "anticipatory and pre-
ventative" constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment. 72
The Court's reasoning in MEIC does not reflect an unusual or extreme
version of constitutional interpretation; the Court instead used a conserva-
tive approach. The Court did not fashion a new right from a self-designed
walk through history, as original meaning proponents advocate, 73 or create
68. In the words of delegate C.B. McNeil: "[I]t was a sign of the times in 1972 of the significance
that the delegates placed upon the environment in the State of Montana. There was no discussion ... of
not having a natural resources article... " C. B. McNeil, District Court Judge, Speech, Can TMDLs
Ensure a Clean and Healthful Environment: A Clean and Healthful Environment and Original Intent
(U. of Mont. L. Sch. Pub. Land L. Conf. 2001), in 22 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 83, 85 (2001).
69. See Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
70. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
72. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1249.
73. Even if one uses an original meaning paradigm to interpret the Constitution's environmental
provisions, those provisions would still be strictly construed in favor of environmental protection. The
early 1970s was a time of powerful citizen activism in favor of environmental protection. The first
Earth Day was held on April 22, 1970. According to the late Senator Gaylord Nelson: "[Ilt was on that
day that Americans made it clear that they understood and were deeply concerned over the deterioration
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a new right based only on current societal norms. To interpret the right to a
clean and healthful environment, the Court used the Constitution's text,
along with the delegates' intent, as evidenced by the Constitutional Conven-
tion transcripts. The Court applied strict scrutiny because that is the analy-
sis the Court uses for all fundamental rights. The fact that this holding was
unanimous, from a diverse panel of justices, underscores the soundness of
the decision.
Shortly after MEIC, the Court was confronted with a local govern-
ment's refusal to permit a new gravel pit near a school.74 The regulatory
scheme for permitting gravel pits did not give the County veto power under
the circumstances; the County's zoning law permitted gravel extraction in
the area, so the County Commissioners could only impose mitigating condi-
tions.7 5 However, the Commissioners denied the permit on the grounds that
it violated the Constitution's right to a clean and healthful environment,
notwithstanding the fact that the gravel pit met relevant statutory require-
ments; they cited the possibility the gravel pit would have adverse health
impacts on the nearby schoolchildren. 76 On appeal, the Court upheld the
district court's conclusion that the Commissioners could not ignore a statu-
tory mandate and assert a constitutional violation, effectively nullifying a
legislative act. 77 The Court based its decision on both the separation of
powers doctrine and the constitutional avoidance doctrine.78 The Court
thus properly reserved for itself "the exclusive power of the courts to deter-
mine if an act of the legislature is unconstitutional." 79
of our environment and the mindless dissipation of our resources. That day left a permanent impact on
the politics of America. It forcibly thrust the issue of environmental quality and resources conservation
into the political dialogue of the Nation. That was the important objective and achievement of Earth
Day. It showed the political and opinion leadership of the country that the people cared, that they were
ready for political action, that the politicians had better get ready, too. In short, Earth Day launched the
Environmental decade with a bang." Gaylord Nelson, Earth Day '70: What It Meant, EPA J. (Apr.
1980) (available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/earthday/O2.htm). Congress and the Montana
Legislature responded with milestone legislation: the federal National Environmental Policy Act (1970),
the modern version of the Clean Air Act (1970), the Montana Environmental Policy Act (1971), and the
Federal Clean Water Act (1972).
74. Merlin Meyers Revocable Trust v. Yellowstone Co., 53 P.3d 1268 (Mont. 2002).
75. Id. at 1269.
76. Id. at 1270.
77. Id. at 1272.
78. Id.
79. Id. Justice Nelson concurred in the result but noted that the County's failure to properly raise
the constitutional issue led to a proper result, but that local governments do have a constitutional duty to
protect the health of citizens. Merlin Meyers Revocable Trust, 53 P.3d. at 1272 (Nelson, J., specially
concurring). Professor Michelle Bryan Mudd argues that local governments have a duty to seek declara-
tory judgments about the validity of laws that force them to act in a fashion that undermines constitu-
tional environmental protections. Michelle Bryan Mudd, A "Constant and Difficult Task": Making Lo-
cal Land Use Decisions in States with a Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment, 38 Ecology
Law Quarterly 101, 117 (2011).
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Subsequent decisions of the Court have also shown a strong respect for
the canon of constitutional "avoidance." In Sunburst School District No. 2
v. Texaco,80 plaintiffs sought tort damages for groundwater contamination
under alternative theories based upon common law nuisance, restoration
damages, and a constitutional tort. 81 Plaintiffs styled their constitutional
tort claim after the so-called "Bivens action," 82 asserting that Texaco
breached its duty to maintain their right to a "clean and healthful environ-
ment."8 3 The Court declined the plaintiff's invitation to extend the applica-
tion of constitutional torts to private parties asserting environmental injury
when common law remedies are adequate.84 Because common law theories
grounded in the Restatement (Second) of Torts allow for restoration dam-
ages,85 the Court distinguished the plaintiffs in Sunburst from those in the
original Montana case recognizing constitutional torts, Dorwart v. Cara-
way.86 In Dorwart, alternative remedies were unavailable;8 7 in Sunburst,
existing common law remedies provided an adequate remedy. 88 That
avoidance demonstrates a restrained approach to discerning the boundaries
of Articles II and IX. In the Court's words: "The availability of restoration
damages under the common law leads us to decline to resolve the issue of
whether a constitutional tort for monetary damages exists pursuant to Arti-
cle II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution for damages caused by a pri-
vate party." 89
More recently, the Court rejected the theory that environmental consti-
tutional rights require a different burden of proof in cases alleging violation
of environmental laws. In Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Department of
Environmental Quality,90 the plaintiffs drew upon the "anticipatory and pre-
ventative" language from the MEIC decision to argue that courts should not
grant the usual deference to administrative agency rules when the rules im-
plicate constitutional environmental rights.9 ' The administrative regulation
80. Sunburst, 165 P.3d 1079.
81. Id. at 1084.
82. Montana recognized constitutional tort theory in Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128 (Mont.
2002). In Dorwart, the Montana Court permitted such a claim against the government. In Sunburst, the
Plaintiffs sought to extend the constitutional tort theory to private parties.
83. Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1084.
84. The Court stated: "Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred in instructing the jury
on the constitutional tort theory where, as here, adequate remedies exist under statutory or common
law." Id. at 1093.
85. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 (1979).
86. Dorwart, 58 P.3d 128.
87. Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1093 (citing Dorwart, 58 P.3d 128).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1098.
90. Clark Fork Coalition v. Mont. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 197 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2008).
91. Petr.'s Br. 39-40 (Mar. 5, 2007), Clark Fork Coalition, 197 P.3d 482. The author does not
wish to heap too much praise on his now-rejected theory. However, it seemed logical to extend the
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at issue allowed the Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") to
grant a perpetual pollution discharge permit to a proposed silver and copper
mine in northwestern Montana. 92 The permit would allow the company to
perpetually discharge polluted groundwater into the Clark Fork River long
after the mine closed. 93
The Court again declined the invitation to extend MEIC. The Court
emphasized that review of administrative regulations "falls squarely within
the established standards" for judicial review of administrative regula-
tions. 94 The DEQ was entitled to a measure of deference even though the
regulation was aimed at preventing pollution. 95 However, the Court did
overturn the DEQ's interpretation of the regulation as contrary to the pur-
poses of the Montana Water Quality Act.96 The Court therefore voided the
permit under traditional canons of statutory interpretation.
The Court's interpretation of the Montana Constitution's environmen-
tal provisions evidences a traditional approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion. The seminal MEIC decision required the Court to determine the na-
ture of the right and the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to statutes
implicating the right. The Court's strict scrutiny analysis was consistent
with other decisions implicating fundamental rights. Subsequent decisions
have shown judicial restraint, not activism. Where alternative statutory or
common law remedies exist, the Court has avoided deciding environmental
cases on constitutional grounds.
V. THE RIGHTS TO OPEN GOVERNMENT
The Montana Constitution contains two related rights that pertain to
open government-the right to know and the right of participation. 97 These
provisions, along with provisions for voter initiatives and referendums, 98
are reflective of broader societal movements towards open government in
MEIC decision's precautionary approach when environmental damage is at stake from cases challenging
the constitutionality of statutes to cases challenging agency interpretation of statutes. The Court felt
otherwise, a determination respected by the litigants involved.
92. Clark Fork Coalition, 197 P.3d at 485-486.
93. Id. at 485. The mine proposal required tunneling into the base of the Cabinet Mountains, the
wettest place in Montana. The mine would have intersected numerous groundwater sources, which
would pour through the exposed mineral deposits in perpetuity. The company sought to discharge that
runoff after partial treatment into the river. Because the underlying hydrological forces cannot be re-
versed, the discharges could never be stopped. Plaintiffs feared both the permanent pollution source and
the fact that the company could abandon the treatment plant after the mine closed, leaving citizens with
little recourse. Petr.'s Br. 9-16 (Mar. 5, 2007), id.; see also Clark Fork Coalition, 197 P.3d at 491-493.
94. Id. at 488.
95. Id. at 487.
96. Id. at 493.
97. Mont. Const. art. II, §§ 8-9.
98. Id. at art. III, §§ 4-5.
Vol. 72
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 72 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol72/iss2/2
INTERPRETING MONTANA'S CONSTITUTION
the 1960s and 1970s. 99 They also implicate another distinct textual right,
the right of privacy, which is discussed in greater detail in the next section.
The United States Constitution lacks open government provisions.
Thus, the Montana Supreme Court lacks federal precedent to aid its inter-
pretation of the right to know and right of participation. While a fundamen-
tal right to open government has potentially far-reaching applications, the
Court's interpretation of that right has been grounded in the same constitu-
tional interpretation principles discussed throughout this article. For exam-
ple, in Havre Daily News, LLC v. City of Havre,100 the Court again demon-
strated restraint when it refused to analyze a constitutional question because
the dispute was both unripe for judicial review and rendered moot by the
City of Havre's actions.101 The Havre Daily News had requested that a
court order the City of Havre to release unredacted initial offense reports
and to implement a policy requiring immediate dissemination of such re-
ports to the public upon request. 10 2 The Court dismissed the case on juris-
dictional grounds: the controversy was not ripe for judicial review because
the record was devoid of a "'concrete fact situation in which the competing
[constitutional right to know and right to privacy] can be weighed." 10 3
Though the Court ultimately concluded the dispute was not ripe for
review, it first provided a method for analyzing the conflicting rights found
in Article II, § 9 (the right to know) and Article II, § 10 (the right of pri-
vacy). The Court stated it was necessary to undertake a fact-intensive in-
quiry when balancing these rights. 10 4 A court must then determine whether
an individual has an actual expectation of privacy and whether society is
willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.10 5 The Court provided
examples of relevant inquiries in examining the reasonableness of an indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy. 10 6 Though the Court could have followed
this roadmap to decide the case, it instead exercised judicial restraint, hold-
ing that the dispute was non-justiciable because the "mere absence of a
policy governing dissemination of documents does not ripen into a violation
99. For example, the United States Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in
1966 to provide citizens access to government documents. In response to the Watergate scandal, Con-
gress strengthened the FOIA in 1974 and overrode President Ford's veto of the amendments, signifying
broad national support for more open government.
100. Havre Daily News, LLC v. City of Havre, 142 P.3d 864 (Mont. 2006).
101. Id. at 873, 877.
102. Id. at 868.
103. Id. at 872 (quoting Cal. Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 56 (1974)).
104. Id. at 870.
105. Id. at 871 (citing Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. City of Bozeman Police Dept., 859 P.2d 435
(Mont. 1993)).
106. Havre Daily News, LLC, 142 P.3d at 871-872.
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of the constitutional right to know unless and until an identifiable person is
actually denied access to a particular document .... "107
More recently, in Disability Rights Montana v. State, 08 the Court up-
held Montana Code Annotated § 41-3-205 as properly balancing the right
to know with the right of privacy. 10 9 The case focused on the conflict be-
tween the public's right to know and the privacy interests inherent in child
abuse and neglect cases.' 10 The statute requires that "all records concerning
reports of child abuse and neglect must be kept confidential except as pro-
vided by this section." 11"' Subsection (2) permits courts to review records in
camera and disclose them to the public if necessary for the fair resolution of
the issue before the court. 112 Disability Rights Montana argued that
§ 41-3-205 violates the right to know in Article II, § 9 of the Constitu-
tion. 11 3
Deferring to the Legislature, the Court determined that subsection (2)
provides a constitutional "mechanism for a court to evaluate on a case by
case basis whether the public's right to know exceeds the individual rights
to privacy." 114 The Court had previously held in Associated Press, Inc. v.
Montana Department of Revenue 115 that the Department of Revenue's blan-
ket determination that all tax returns were confidential violated the right to
know under Article II, § 9 because it lacked a mechanism to balance the
right to know with the right of privacy. 116 In Disability Rights Montana,
the Court accepted the balancing mechanism outlined in § 41-3-205(2) as
constitutional by relying on Associated Press. 1'7 Justice Morris, writing for
a unanimous court, rejected an unyielding construction of the right to know.
He relied instead on settled canons of constitutional construction to "con-
strue statutes narrowly to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality."" 8
Another right that is part of the Montana Constitution's open govern-
ment requirements is embodied in Article II, § 8-the right to participate in
107. Id. at 872. In addition, the Court held that the case was moot because the City of Havre pro-
vided the requested reports to the newspaper. Id. at 874. The newspaper argued that the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine applied, but the Court rejected the
argument stating that the newspaper provided no "'concrete evidence suggesting that Havre will perpe-
trate a substantially similar wrong.'" Id. at 877.
108. DisabiliA- Rights Mont. v. State, 207 P.3d 1092 (Mont. 2009).
109. Id. at 1096.
110. Id. at 1095.
111. Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-205(2).
112. Id.
113. Disability Rights Mont., 207 P.3d at 1094.
114. Id. at 1096.
115. Associated Press v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 4 P.3d 5 (2000).
116. Id. at 11.
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government, also known as the "open meetings provision." 119 The Court
has not hesitated to exercise its responsibility to apply the plain terms of
this provision when government entities act behind closed doors. 120 Void-
ing actions taken at closed meetings fulfills the Court's role as a check on
abusive government power. However, the Court has also developed a
three-part test to analyze open meeting violations, consistent with the Legis-
lature's effort to implement Article II, § 9.121 Application of the three-part
test can lead the Court to avoid the constitutional question altogether. 122
Again, this jurisprudence demonstrates the Court's unwillingness to analyze
a constitutional question when it can avoid doing so. Such reticence exem-
plifies the Court's cautious development of the Montana Constitution, and
its willingness to employ long-standing constitutional standards to avoid
constitutional questions. 123
VI. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The right to know cases establish that the Montana Supreme Court
balances Article II, § 9 with the right of privacy under Article II, § 10 when
both rights are implicated. However, the right of privacy extends to other
spheres as well. Interpretation of the right of privacy under the Montana
Constitution is complicated by the United States Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of a "right to privacy" in the United States Constitution, despite the
lack of an explicit textual right.' 24 Thus, the Montana Supreme Court must
address the United States Supreme Court's development of privacy juris-
prudence while simultaneously charting a course based on the plain lan-
guage of Article II, § 10.
The delegates' decision to include a fundamental, textual right to pri-
vacy signaled a desire to create a right of privacy more protective than the
"penumbral" right espoused in Griswold 25 in 1965.126 One of the most
119. Mont. Const. art. II, § 8.
120. See Bd. of Trustees, Huntley Proj. Sch. Dist. No. 24 v. Bd. of Co. Commrs. of Yellowstone Co.,
606 P.2d 1069 (Mont. 1980).
121. Com. Cause v. Statutory Comm. to Nominate Candidates for Comm. of Political Prac., 868
P.2d 604, 607 (Mont. 1994) (noting that the three-part analysis was necessary to determine whether the
Constitution was even implicated (e.g. is the contested event even a meeting?) because courts should
avoid constitutional questions if an issue can be resolved otherwise).
122. Nelson v. Bucks, 236 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2010).
123. See Pet. of Billings High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Billings Gazette, 149 P.3d 864 (Mont. 2006)
(relying on Havre Daily Nevis in declining to address a similar constitutional issue by holding that the
controversy was moot).
124. In Griswold v. Conn., six Justices recognized the right of privacy as a fundamental constitu-
tional right, finding the right implicit in the numerous other privacy-oriented rights in the Constitution.
381 U.S. 479 (1965). The United States Supreme Court has more recently placed the right within the
"liberty" guarantees of the Due Process Clause. See e.g. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 538 (2003).
125. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
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significant Montana Supreme Court decisions interpreting the right of pri-
vacy occurred in the 1999 case Gryczan v. State.' 27 Gryczan implicated a
controversial and politically divisive subject-same-sex rights.128 One
could argue that the Court embodied an activist, expansive approach to con-
stitutional rights when it declared a statute that criminalized consensual
same-sex sexual relations unconstitutional. 129 After all, the Court broke
ranks with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick;' 30 the United States Supreme Court had refused to find a similar
Georgia statute unconstitutional based on the penumbral right of privacy.
But a close reading of Gryczan reveals a more conservative, traditional ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation.
In Gryzcan, the Court confronted the obvious. Unlike the federal Con-
stitution, the Montana Constitution includes an express, textual right to pri-
vacy. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, which has struggled to find
a constitutional footing' 3' for a right that was indispensable to the founding
of our nation and is integral to the fabric of a civil society, 132 the Montana
Supreme Court can rely on the textual right of privacy. Moreover, because
the right of privacy is stated in our Constitution's Declaration of Rights, it
requires a strict scrutiny analysis. 133 Unlike the right to know cases, in
which privacy is balanced with another fundamental right, the statute in
Gryczan had to stand or fall on its own. The Court held the State lacked a
compelling interest to ban certain forms of sexual activity for homosexuals
while allowing the activity for heterosexuals. 134 Not only was the Court's
decision sound because it applied a heightened level of scrutiny to a funda-
126. Id. at 482-487.
127. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1999).
128. Id. at 115.
129. See Gryczan, 942 P.2d 112.
130. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
131. The U.S. Constitution does not contain a textual right of privacy. In Griswold, the majority
opinion authored by Justice Douglas found the right in "penumbras" that were "emanating" from textual
rights. Justice Goldberg relied on the Ninth Amendment while concurrences by Justices Harlan and
White found the right of privacy in the due process clause. The divergent views demonstrate the diffi-
culty the Court had in finding a doctrinal basis for the right, though the Court recognized that the
tradition of individual privacy runs strong in American history and culture. More recently, the Court has
consistently based the right of privacy on the liberty interests of the due process clause. Chemerinsky,
supra n. 28, at 815-816; see also Lawrence, 529 U.S. 538; Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa., 505 U.S.
833.
132. See Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Justice Brandeis's eloquent words bear repeating:
"The makers of our Constitution ... conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The Montana Court paid homage to these words in Gryczan. 942 P.2d at 121.
133. Grvczan, 942 P.2d at 121-122.
134. Id. at 126.
254 Vol. 72
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 72 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol72/iss2/2
INTERPRETING MONTANA'S CONSTITUTION
mental right, but it was prescient as well. Four years later, the United States
Supreme Court overruled Bowers and held a similar Texas prohibition un-
constitutional under the liberty interests of the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. 135
Grvczan is a powerful interpretation of the right to privacy. However,
the path the Court took was well within the norms of constitutional con-
struction. The right to privacy is fundamental like other Article II rights:
the Court was obliged to apply a strict scrutiny analysis. 136 The State's
compelling interest argument-to protect the public from HIV transmis-
sion-melted in the face of the statistical evidence in the record.' 37 The
public morality argument was also rejected. Rather than engage in judicial
activism based on morality, the Court based its analysis on the traditional
strict scrutiny analysis.' 38
Moreover, the Court has not used Gryczan to launch a campaign to
expand the right. Rather, the Court has shown restraint. In Baxter v. State,
the Court avoided applying the right to privacy to a criminal statute in the
context of rights for the terminally ill. Though both sides had briefed the
constitutional issues extensively, the Court instead resolved the case on stat-
utory grounds. 139
In the civil context discussed in this article, the Montana Supreme
Court's privacy jurisprudence has been consistent with norms of constitu-
tional interpretation. Because privacy, like the right to a clean environment,
is fundamental, the Court applied strict scrutiny to statutes implicating the
right. The result in Grvczan was to protect the rights of citizens from state-
sponsored meddling in personal matters. But when the right to privacy was
asserted in contravention of the right to know, the Court balanced both
rights. In Baxter, the Court, consistent with the principle of constitutional
avoidance, avoided a thorny constitutional issue by interpreting a statute
instead.
135. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
136. (;I an. 942 P.2d at 122.
137. While the State argued that the statute protected public health by preventing the transmission of
HIV, Montana's own statistics showed that heterosexual contact is "now the leading mode of HIV
transmission in this country." Id. at 124 (referencing Centers for Disease Control data).
138. Id. at 125. The Court also relied on Madison's words in The Federalist No. 51 regarding the
role of a Constitution to protect against the "tyranny of the majority." Id.
139. Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1215. The Baxter case was controversial and politically charged; the list of
amici on both sides attests to the volatility of the right to die issue in Montana and the pressure on the
Court to address the constitutional aspects of the issue. Id. at 1211.
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VII. WHY PROPONENTS OF THE CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION WERE MISGUIDED
The purpose of this article is not simply to catalogue a few Montana
constitutional cases and show how the Montana Supreme Court has gener-
ally followed long-established and even conservative legal norms. The im-
petus for this article was the misinformation about the Court's interpretation
of the 1972 Constitution that surrounded the 2010 debate over the need for
a constitutional convention. A careful review of how the Court has actually
interpreted the Constitution reveals that its approach has been well within
the mainstream of constitutional interpretation and that the proponents' call
for a new constitutional convention relied on overblown rhetoric rather than
cogent legal analysis.
Certainly, urging voters to reconsider the Constitution was an appro-
priate topic for public debate. Indeed, the 1972 Constitution requires it.
However, the proponents' claims were long on innuendo and short on spe-
cifics. For example, one leading proponent stated in a guest editorial:
Montana's constitution is a lawyer's dream. Why? Because it's filled with
ambiguities, self-contradictions, and misadventures into guaranteeing costly
entitlements. All three errors are fodder for multiple lawsuits. These same
three problems which give lawyers a healthy income brokering lawsuits, also
give courts ample opportunity to adjudicate those lawsuits with an unhealthy
dose of dictatorial judicial intrusion into Montana's economy, schools, polit-
ics, and individual rights.140
But the editorial provided no examples of the ambiguities and misadven-
tures inherent in the Constitution, nor did it provide a detailed list of cases
that represent the Court's "unhealthy dose of dictatorial judicial intrusion."
Other criticisms were similarly unfounded. 141
Proponents further claimed the Court interprets the Constitution to the
detriment of citizens. In their words, the Constitution "empowers judges
and bureaucratic rulemakers to micro-meddle in your property rights, busi-
ness affairs, and personal conduct." 142 However, proponents failed to pro-
vide any examples of judges "micro-meddling" in personal affairs. If any-
thing, decisions like Gryczan demonstrate the opposite is true; the rights in
140. Joe Balyeat, Ltr. to the Ed., Do We Need a Constitutional Convention? Fix Critical Mistakes
from 1972 Gathering, Missoulian (October 24, 2010) (available at http://missoulian.comInews/opinion/
columnists/article f737786a-delO I ldf-a973-001cc4c03286.html).
141. For example, Brian Schoof, a candidate for the 2010 Montana Legislature, opined of the Mon-
tana Constitution: "It's vague, open to a lot of interpretation and was written by a bunch of 1960s
hippies. It's not a good constitution." See also Erin Cole, What if You Threw a Constitutional Conven-
tion and the Tea Party Never Came?, Patchwork Nation, http://www.patchworknation.org/content/what-
if-you-threw-a-constitutional-convention-and-the-tea-party-never-came (last accessed Feb. 27, 2011).
142. Balyeat & Miller, supra n. 8, at 2.
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the Constitution have been interpreted to prevent the government from
meddling in private affairs.
Additionally, proponents claimed the Constitution spurs "overzealous"
courts to limit property rights. 143 The constitutional provision at the heart
of this disdain is the right to a clean and healthful environment. Criticism
centered on this provision in both the Voter Information Pamphlet and
newspaper editorials and letters to the editor.' 44 For example, in the Voter
Information Pamphlet, the proponents stated: "The 'clean and healthful'
provision, for example, has been expanded by Montana's overzealous
courts to prohibit any public or private activity which 'implicates' the envi-
ronment unless you can prove a compelling state interest ."145 This
assertion is both a misstatement of the law and a gross exaggeration.
As explained above, the Montana courts have not been "overzealous"
by any objective measure. The decisions in Merlin Meyers and Clark Fork
Coalition demonstrate that the Montana Court has taken a restrained ap-
proach, rejecting opportunities that an "overzealous" court might use to ex-
pand the provision's reach. Moreover, to say that any public or private
activity that implicates the environment must be justified by a compelling
state interest is wrong. A new gravel pit and the permanent discharge of
pollutants-the private actions at issue in Merlin Mevers and Clark Fork
Coalition-implicate the environment, yet the Court declined to review
whether they violate the right to a clean and healthful environment because
those activities are subject to state regulatory schemes. In fact the Court's
actual record following MEIC reveals only one other case where constitu-
tional environmental provisions affected a business or property dispute. 146
Though proponents decry the use of the Constitution as a usurpation of the
legislative and political processes,1 47 in both the Merlin Myers and the
Clark Fork Coalition cases, the Court deferred to the Legislature and de-
cided the cases on the basis of statutory law, not the right to a clean and
healthful environment. 148
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also Johnson, supra n. 56; Don Larson. Ltr. to the Ed., State Ballot Measures: Rights
Need Fixing; Vote Jbr CC-2, Missoulian (Oct. 27, 2010) (available at http://missoulian.com/news/
opinion/mailbag/article dc81466c-e ld I-I ldf-8046-001 cc4cOO2eO.html).
145. Balyeat & Miller, supra n. 8, at 2 (emphasis in original).
146. Cape-France Enters. v. Est. of Lola Peed, 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001). There, the Court applied
Articles 11 and IX to a contract dispute and held that "[i]n light of these two provisions of Montana's
Constitution, it would be unlawful for Cape-France, a private business entity, to drill a well on its
property in the face of substantial evidence that doing so may cause significant degradation of uncon-
taminated aquifers and pose serious public health risks." Id. at 1017.
147. See Johnson, supra n. 56.
148. Merlin Meyers, 53 P.3d at 1272; Clark Fork Coalition, 197 P.3d at 489-493. The author wants
to make clear his view that, notwithstanding the limited judicial application of Montana's constitutional
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The one specific example of judicial misfeasance cited by the propo-
nents, Marshall v. State ex rel. CooneN, 149 lends no credence to the call for
reform. Marshall involved a challenge to the constitutionality of CI-75, a
voter-approved initiative that amended multiple parts of the 1972 Constitu-
tion.' 50  The Montana Court determined that CI-75 violated Article XIV,
§ 11, which requires that amendments to the Constitution be voted on sepa-
rately, because CI-75 amended numerous portions of the Constitution in a
single initiative.15' The proponents claimed the Marshall case makes it
-virtually impossible to achieve significant constitutional reform through
the initiative process."' 52 Yet the same proponents then criticize the Con-
stitution for having been amended numerous times.' 53
The problem in Marshall was that the drafters of CI-75 failed to read
the plain language of Article XI and included more than one amendment in
a single initiative, which the Constitution flatly prohibits. The Montana
Constitution is not difficult to amend. The Constitution's amendment pro-
cedures are highly democratic and provide for amendment by (1) legislative
referendum, (2) constitutional convention, and (3) initiative.1 54 In fact, the
Montana Constitution has been amended 13 times by citizen initiative in 40
years. In the decade following the Marshall decision, 26 constitutional ini-
tiatives have been proposed and two have passed.' 55 The vast majority of
these initiatives did not reach the ballot due to insufficient voter interest in
placing the measure on the ballot.' 56 The claim that constitutional reform
cannot be achieved because of the Marshall decision is not justified by the
facts.
Not only did the proponents fail to advance cogent and accurate rea-
sons for a new constitutional convention, they were short on real-life exam-
ples of how the Court's "micro-meddling" in business or personal affairs
has hurt Montanans. By many economic measures, Montana has prospered
in the last four decades.'1 7 The decline of traditional industries-logging,
environmental rights, the rights are powerful substantive rights, unique by comparison to other state
constitutions, to be cherished, not reviled.
149. Balyeat & Miller, supra n. 8, at 3 (citing Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooner, 975 P.2d 325 (Mont.
1999)).
150. Marshall, 975 P.2d at 327-328.
151. Id. at 332-333.
152. Balyeat & Miller, supra n. 8, at 3.
153. Id. at 4.
154. See Mont. Const. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2, 8, 9.
155. Mont. Sec. of St., Proposed Amendments to the 1972 Constitution (available at http://sos.mt.
gov/elections/Forms/history/constitutionalmeasureslist201 0.pdf).
156. Id.
157. For example, the Montana Department of Commerce states that "since 2001 Montana's econ-
omy has outperformed the national economy." Census & Econ. Devt. Ctr., Mont. Dept. of Com.,
Turning Data into Knowledge (Jun. 23, 2009) (available at http://ceic.mt.gov/Publications/Highlights/
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for example-can be traced to market forces and federal land management
policies, not the state Constitution.158 Those claiming the Montana Court
has "micro-meddled" in business affairs have never provided an extensive
list of examples to support their contention. In fact, the reported cases re-
garding Montana Constitution's environmental protections reveal a dearth
of activities that were actually halted by the Constitution. 159 The other
rights discussed in this article, privacy and open government, hardly can be
traced to judicial "micro-meddling" because they serve to protect individu-
als from overly intrusive government activities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While today's political climate is susceptible to manipulation by sling-
ing phrases like "overzealous courts" or "activist judges," the actual record
of the Montana Supreme Court belies such charges. As discussed above,
the Montana Court follows well-established norms of constitutional inter-
pretation, but that truth was missing from the arguments advanced by those
seeking a new constitutional convention. Therein lies the real damage of
the proponents' argument for a new constitutional convention. It is vital to
engage in a debate about the wisdom of how our Constitution has been
interpreted and whether there is need for change. But a misinformed debate
tears at the heart of our political fabric and undermines the very institutions
that we must respect and cherish in a constitutional democracy.
highlights-bea gdp-0609.pdf). Job growth in Montana outpaced the national average during the period
1969-2008. Regl. Econ. Analysis Proj., REAProject.org (data on file with the Mont. L. Rev.).
158. The decline of the Montana timber industry is tied to several factors, none of which implicate
the Montana Constitution. Of major concern are allegedly subsidized Canadian softwood imports that
have led to one of the world's longest-running trade disputes. See Ministry of Forests, Lands, & Natural
Resource Operations, Brit. Colum., Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute with the United States, http://www.
for.gov.bc.ca/het/softwood/ABCPF%20softwood%20dispute%20section%202004%20rev.pdf (last ac-
cessed Mar. 23, 2011). As recently as 2006, Montana Senator Max Baucus urged the federal govern-
ment to do more to protect domestic timber companies. U.S. Sen. Comm. on Fin., Baucus, Chambliss
Seek Full Enforcement of Softwood Lumber Agreement with Canada, http://finance.senate.gov/news
room/chairman/release/?id=7db 13165-f983-456f-b lcc-2bc2al0ffdc (last accessed Mar. 23, 2011). A
2002 article from the Federal Reserve Bank explained a complex web of factors that affect the timber
industry. The article stated: "Global competition, the high value of the dollar compared with other
currencies, limited logging on federal lands and weakness in the domestic economy are affecting all
parts of the forest products industry, which are in simultaneous down cycles for the first time in recent
memory." Jane Brisset, Theme Song for Softwood Lumber: Oh, Canada, http://www.minneapolisfed.
org/publications-papers/pub-display.cfm?id=2051 (last accessed Mar. 23, 2011). While the loss of
traditional natural resource jobs to local communities is indeed tragic for those affected, none of the
contributing factors have anything to do with the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment.
159. For example, the Seven-Up Pete cyanide heap leach gold mine that tried to conduct the ground-
water pump tests halted by the MEIC decision eventually failed because the voters passed Initiative 137,
which outlawed the practice of cyanide heap leach gold mining. Seven-Up Pete Joint Venture v. Mont.,
114 P.3d 1009, 1015 (Mont. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006).
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Those advocating changes in the Constitution bear a responsibility to
examine the Montana Court's jurisprudence. The development-and limi-
tation-of constitutional rights and responsibilities occurs over decades.
The richness of our state Constitution's provisions and the Court's interpre-
tations of them evolve slowly. The Montana Court's decisions remain open
to critique; constitutional meaning will change over time. However, signifi-
cantly reforming the document after a mere 40 years defeats the very pur-
pose of having a constitution. As the great United States Supreme Court
Justice John Marshall explained, "we must never forget that it is a constitu-
tion we are expounding."' 160
160. McCulloch v. Md, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
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